## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

VIDEO GAMING TECHNOLOGIES,	INC.,	)	
Pl ai nti ff,	<b>;</b>	)	
-VS-	; ;	No.	17-CV-454-GKF-JFJ
CASTLE HILL STUDIOS, INC.,	et al.,	)	
Defendant(s).	;	)	

TRANSCRIPT OF PRETRIAL HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY K. FRIZZELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SEPTEMBER 3, 2019

REPORTED BY: BRI AN P. NEI L, RMR-CRR Uni ted States Court Reporter

> Brian P. Neil, RMR-CRR U.S. District Court - NDOK

## APPEARANCES

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Robert C. Gill, Henry A. Platt, and Matthew J. Antonelli, Attorneys at Law, Saul, Ewing, Arnstein & Lehr, 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 550, Washington, DC, 20006, attorneys on behalf of the Defendants;

Jonathan S. Jacobs, Attorney at Law, Zobrist Law Group, 1900 Arlington Boulevard, Suite B, Charlottesville, Virginia, 22905, attorney on behalf of the Defendants;

James C. Hodges, Attorney at Law, 2622 East 21st Street, Suite 4, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74114, attorney on behalf of the Defendants.

**Thomas G. Connolly,** Attorney at Law, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis, 1919 M Street N.W., Suite 800, Washington, DC, 20036, attorney on behalf of the Defendants.

1 Tuesday, September 3, 2019 2 DEPUTY COURT CLERK: This is Case No. 17-CV-454-GKF, 3 4 Video Gaming Technologies, Inc. v. Castle Hill Studios, LLC. 5 Counsel, please state your appearances for the record. 6 MR. LUTHEY: Dean Luthey for the plaintiff. 7 MR. RUBMAN: Good afternoon. Gary Rubman from 8 Covington for the plaintiff. I'm joined by Peter Swanson and 9 Rebecca Dalton also from Covington. 10 THE COURT: Welcome. 11 MR. GILL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Robert Gill 12 and Henry Platt and Matthew Antonelli from the Saul, Ewing, 13 Arnstein & Lehr law firm on behalf of defendants. 14 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 15 MR. HODGES: Afternoon, Your Honor. James Hodges for the defendants. I'd like to also introduce a new counsel 16 17 for the defendants, Thomas Connolly. 18 MR. CONNOLLY: Your Honor, good afternoon. 19 you. 20 THE COURT: Good afternoon. And, in addition, we 21 have one more on the phone, Karen? 22 **DEPUTY COURT CLERK:** Mr. Jacobs. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Jacobs, can you hear us? 24 MR. JACOBS: Yes. I can hear -- I can hear some 25 portion of what's going on. Nice to be here and be a voice,

Your Honor. Thanks for having me.

THE COURT: And where were you detained, Atlanta?

MR. JACOBS: I'm stuck in Atlanta. My flight to

Atlanta was delayed and so I couldn't make it to Tulsa on time.

Bad luck.

THE COURT: I see some knowing nods in the attorneys in front of me who've also been stuck in Atlanta at times in the past. I recommend Charlotte when you're coming to and from Washington.

All right. We've got a number of issues here. This is one of these rare cases where unfortunately we're at the final pretrial conference and we don't know yet what's going to be tried because the parties take disparate positions with regard to the claims that remain even after what the court believed to be clear rulings.

The first issue is one that was raised in the brief filed by Castle Hill with regard to unusual objections to deposition designations at docket No. 366. The court concurs with Castle Hill's position contained in its briefing that VGT is reading the court's ruling on page 9 of docket No. 344 -- that is the ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment of Plaintiff VGT -- in that VGT is reading that ruling too broadly. In that order, the court merely held that Castle Hill had produced insufficient evidence as to its affirmative defense of unclean hands with respect to VGT's asserted

trademarks and trade secrets. The court limited Castle Hill Gaming's unclean hands defense to VGT's trade dress claims.

It appears that VGT is now reading that decision to preclude fast-follow evidence from CHG to defend VGT's know-how claim. For example, in an effort to defend against VGT's know-how claim with respect to claim volatility, it appears to the court that Castle Hill may attempt to show that an observer, for instance, can determine volatility without resort to alleged know-how trade secrets. So VGT's position goes too far. And I thought that was important because it's showing up in a lot of permutations, objections to deposition designations, that sort of thing.

Now, you all have framed up a number of the issues fairly well in the joint proposed pretrial order. The first issue begins on page 2 of the joint proposed pretrial order. With respect to the dispute regarding trade dress on pages 1 through 3 of the proposed pretrial order, VGT attempts to insert "themes" as a seventh element of its trade dress claim and 14 new game series which it proposes the court evaluate at trial.

The court rules, based upon the briefing, that VGT shall not be permitted to backdoor 14 additional game titles into its trade dress claim. Specifically, the court cites the following: First, VGT's current position is contrary to the position that it took during the dispositive motion hearing.

In that hearing, counsel for VGT stated as follows, and I quote: "But anyway, to make clear what is at issue here, this is the trade dress that's at issue. There's six elements.

There's the game cabinet, the red strobe at the top, the reel resolution sound that we heard, the award sound that we heard, the bingo pays and plays and the red swing free spins. These six elements in combination, no one in isolation, but all six in combination are the trade dress at issue.

"The trademarks at issue, there are four series of games in which we are -- on which we are basing our claims:

Crazy Billions, Mr. Money Bags, Polar High Roller, and

Greenback Jack. Within those trademarks, there are -- within each series of those, there are four types of marks for which we seek protection: The word marks, the logo marks, the artwork on each panel, and then the characters."

Further, the PowerPoint presentation provided by VGT to the court identifies only the foregoing six elements as being VGT's trade dress at issue and the four VGT game series.

Further, as discussed in the court's order on Castle
Hill's motion for summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit
previously recognized that "an articulation requirement for a
protectable mark" and noted that other circuits have adopted a
requirement that a plaintiff "articulate the specific elements
which comprise its distinct dress."

And I'm citing Forney Industries, 835 F.3d 1238, at

page 1232, (10th Cir. 2016), quoting *Landscape Forms, Inc.* I won't further burden the record with the citation there.

Further, when a plaintiff claims protection of trade dress utilized across a line of products, courts have required a plaintiff to "articulate the specific common elements sought to be protected."

VGT now points to its "themes/marks" but failed to identify any themes or marks in its summary judgment briefing apart from the four-game series discussed in the order. The general concept of themes is overbroad and cannot constitute a specific common element, particularly in view of VGT's representations to the court at the summary judgment hearing to be protected as trade dress.

So that addresses the first issue.

Secondly, with regard to the issue at pages 4 through 6 of the proposed pretrial order with regard to trademark, VGT contends that the VGT common law trademark claim includes, No. 1, the character of Mr. Money Bags himself; and No. 2, Mr. Money Bags and design mark as it appears in color.

It would appear to the court that VGT has never before asserted these specific claims. This court granted summary judgment on all common law trademark claims other than those based on the marks Crazy Billions; Mr. Money Bags, the modernized version; and Polar High Roller. So, I mean, it would appear, unless there's something that the court is

1 completely missing, that we've ruled on this and this is 2 asserted now for the very first time in this lawsuit. 3 Mr. Rubman. 4 MR. SWANSON: Actually, I'll address that, Your 5 Honor. THE COURT: Yes, sir. 6 7 MR. SWANSON: With respect to the common law 8 trademark claim for Mr. Money Bags, Your Honor, we believe we 9 have been consistent, that that claim includes the logo and 10 Mr. Money Bags' character in color. This was in our 11 interrogatory response that Your Honor has reviewed. 12 included color photographs or color images of the artwork of 13 all the games at issue, including Mr. Money Bags. 14 identification of the extant claims, we further made clear that 15 it was the artwork for Mr. Money Bags. 16 A couple of other points. In our summary judgment 17 opposition, in describing the unregistered marks on page 12 --18 **THE COURT:** Got it right in front of me. 19 MR. SWANSON: -- we included the original Mr. Money 20 Bags artwork or logo in color on page 12 and that was 21 underneath unregistered trademarks. 22 THE COURT: So does VGT agree apparently that the 23 registered mark in color does not fall within the registered 24 trademark claim?

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MR. SWANSON: So the trademark registration is not

1 limited to color. 2 THE COURT: Now, that's not my question. That's not 3 my question. 4 MR. SWANSON: Uh-huh. 5 THE COURT: You appear to concede here that the 6 registered mark in color does not fall within the registered 7 trademark claim. Is that correct? That's -- yes. If I understand your 8 MR. SWANSON: 9 question, Your Honor, the --10 THE COURT: Because you're trying to insert it here 11 in the common law trademark claim; correct? 12 MR. SWANSON: Correct. That would be the 13 distinction between --14 THE COURT: So you're conceding here on the record 15 that the registered marked in color does not fall within the 16 registered trademark claim; correct? 17 MR. SWANSON: The Mr. Money Bags design mark that's 18 part of the registered trademark claim --19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. SWANSON: -- is not in color, correct. Yeah. 21 0kay. THE COURT: So point out to me where you have 22 alleged either that the character of Mr. Money Bags himself is 23 one of your common law trademarks claims and/or that Mr. Money

Bags, the design mark, as it appears in color is part of your

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common law trademark claim.

1 MR. SWANSON: Sure, Your Honor. So in our -- again, 2 in our interrogatory response -- this is our response to 3 interrogatory No. 1 on the trademark claims --4 THE COURT: Where's that in the pile of stuff Okay. that's been prepared to me? 5 MR. SWANSON: 6 Sure. 7 THE COURT: And I've got a room next door that is 8 covered on three lengthy tables with the materials that you've 9 provided to me so I can take a quick jaunt over there and find 10 it in the mountain of paper. 11 Actually, why don't I grab --MR. SWANSON: Sure. 12 (Discussion held off the record) 13 THE COURT: And that's 185-11 or something; is that 14 correct? 15 MR. SWANSON: The document for the interrogatory 16 response? 17 THE COURT: Yes. 18 MR. SWANSON: I actually don't have it in front of 19 me but that --20 THE COURT: I think we're going to run and get it. 21 MR. SWANSON: Okay. 22 THE COURT: In speaking with my clerk, the concern 23 here was to the extent that the registered mark in color would 24 fall within the registered mark claim, our concern was that you 25 couldn't seek recovery for both. And now that you concede that

it's not part of the registered claim, the view is that the order on summary judgment would allow you to include in your common law claims the registered mark in color. So that would leave us then only dealing with your position that the character of Mr. Money Bags himself is part of your common law trademark claim.

MR. SWANSON: Sure. And on that, Your Honor, I can show you in the interrogatory response, once we have that, where we referred to the character in the response. I would also refer Your Honor to docket No. 143 which was VGT's identification of extant trademark infringement claims. And --

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: Okay. I've got 185-11 and it appears to be easily -- well, it's 198 pages.

MR. SWANSON: Yes.

THE COURT: So you might want to refer me somewhere within the 198 pages. Forgive me for not having instant recall.

MR. SWANSON: Sure, Your Honor. So page -- the bottom of page 8 --

THE COURT: The words as well as the visual images incorporated into the games?

MR. SWANSON: Correct. Including the game's artwork, characters, and logos. And we made a similar statement in docket No. 143. Actually, to be more specific,

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 THE COURT: 10 11 22? 12 MR. SWANSON: 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. SWANSON: 15 16 litigation." 17 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 18 MR. SWANSON:

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Your Honor, on page 22 of the interrogatory response, which was the subpart of that interrogatory response in which we were discussing Mr. Money Bags specifically, in the middle of that paragraph in the middle of the page on 22, we say, "VGT relies on at least the following marks used in connection with Mr. Money Bags game title, the word mark, the artwork," and then towards the end of that paragraph, "and the Mr. Money Bags character as depicted on the Mr. Money Bags game and elsewhere.

I don't seem to be following -- are you saying 22 of 199 or 22 with the page number on the bottom as

Page number on the bottom, Your Honor.

Refer me again to the sentence.

So if we're looking at the same thing, it's the paragraph that begins "for purposes of this

And it goes on to say, "VGT relies on at least the following marks used in connection with the Mr. Money Bags game title," and then we list several. If you jump to the end of that paragraph, four lines up from the bottom, "and the Mr. Money Bags character as depicted on the Mr. Money Bags game and elsewhere."

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

Mr. Gill.

MR. SWANSON: That in docket No. 143, again, refers specifically to the Mr. Money Bags character.

THE COURT: All right. And let me take a look at it here.

MR. SWANSON: And this would be starting at the bottom of page 1 and then going on to page 2, "and the game's characters; i.e., Crazy Bill, Dynamite Daisy, Mr. Money Bags."

THE COURT: All right. Frankly, you had used this language that's contained on page 22 -- it's actually page 23 of 199 -- in your sixth supplemental objections and responses to Defendant Castle Hill Studio, LLC's first set of interrogatories, the 199-page document. That paragraph was used as a common response with respect to many of these series, and we read this as being one of the factors in combination that you relied upon as evidenced by the colon followed by the words "the Mr. Money Bags word mark," etcetera, etcetera etcetera, etcetera.

MR. SWANSON: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: So let me get a response here from

MR. SWANSON: And just to be clear on that, Your Honor, I mean, I do think that we are suggesting the approach the court took in the summary judgment ruling is the correct approach, looking at the name, the artwork, the character, the colors, looking at all those elements together.

THE COURT: All right. But now as I understand it -- maybe I misunderstand -- but you're saying that the common law trademark claim includes, as a stand-alone claim, the character of Mr. Money Bags himself?

MR. SWANSON: I mean, the way we've defined it is it's the artwork, including the character, and the name. It is those elements looking at all those elements together.

THE COURT: Perhaps this is just a failure to communicate. Let me get Mr. Gill's view here.

MR. SWANSON: Yes.

MR. GILL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm a little hesitant to raise this issue that I brought up when we were here for our summary judgment argument, but it's an issue that presents itself again and here we are 13 days before trial.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: And, first of all, let me start with the very first issue your Honor addressed with Mr. Swanson, which was the issue of the Mr. Money Bags mark and whether or not the colorization was part of the claim, and I think he agreed that it was not part of the claim but I have to say I agree. Having seen the registration and the application for registration, I think that is not part of the registered mark claim.

So the only way --

THE COURT: Color? Color is not?

MR. GILL: Exactly.

THE COURT: Right.

**MR. GILL:** The only way it could be part of a claim would be part of the common law claim.

My problem with the common law claims in this case as general matter is -- and you and I actually had this colloquy at the summary judgment hearing -- with a claim based on a registered mark, I have a very precise identification of what the mark is at issue. I have a specimen of the mark that's been accepted for registration by the Patent and Trademark Office and that has been vetted by them.

But with a common law mark --

THE COURT: You chose this area of law to practice in.

MR. GILL: I understand that. I understand that.

The problem with a common law mark is that we don't have in this case a sufficiently specific description of the mark. So we do have a generic description that was given by the plaintiff that includes the artwork and the logos and the characters. The problem is, the way the language was used it looks as if to me what the claim was was the characters as part of the overall artwork that's used in what's depicted on the game, not the character individually. So I did not understand and the statement of extant trademark claims that was filed by the plaintiff with this court did nothing to inform me that they were making a claim based on any kind of character on an

As a matter of fact, when Your Honor engaged Mr. Roman on an issue at the summary judgment hearing and Your Honor asked him about the issue or the doctrine of family of marks, Mr. Roman said in response to Your Honor that I'm not familiar with that, we're not claiming that here.

So to me, in order for them to make a claim for infringement of a common law mark based on a character, then that's something that would need to be specifically alleged so we know what the nature of it is to the claim that they're alleging. It remains to me a defect with the common law claims in this case that the plaintiff has never specifically identified the common law marks. They have generically.

So, for example, they would say, we claim the Mr. Money Bags modernized version is a common law mark. But what they don't do is accompanying that put in the very specific artwork that they're claiming to get protection from. And what we do know is that other variations of the Mr. Money Bags mark have now been dismissed from this lawsuit in the course of summary judgment.

So what seems clear to me on this record is that this plaintiff may not claim trademark protection for common law trademarks for the characters used in the Mr. Money Bags mark and all those derivations of the Mr. Money Bags games that, for example, have been dismissed from this lawsuit. The only

Mr. Money Bags mark that remains is the registered mark, which is the design logo, and then the common law mark for the modernized version. Those two marks are it.

THE COURT: Which would be colorized; correct?

MR. GILL: The modernized version?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GILL: Yes, Your Honor. Yes, yes.

THE COURT: And that's on page 35 of the court's order.

MR. GILL: Right.

THE COURT: But to go the direction that VGT is now urging the court to go now only 13 days before trial basically I'd undermine the court's ruling, right or wrong, as to Mr. Money Bags 2, Mr. Money Bags Deluxe, Mr. Money Bags Deluxe (Beach Marks), Mr. Money Bags Lucky Streak, Mr. Money Bags Bring in the Bucks, Mr. Money Bags Road to Riches, and Mr. Money Bags Sparkling Wilds.

MR. GILL: I agree with that a hundred percent and that is our position. Those are out of this case and I do not feel like this plaintiff has sufficiently identified for us -- it's one thing for the plaintiff to say early in the litigation that in a 200-page interrogatory response, we're claiming the following, and the language which was always used in the interrogatory answers is, the plaintiff claims the following, including, but not limited to, and then there's a long

But now we're at the very end of this funnel that is the litigation process where things are supposed to be defined over time. I didn't view the filing and identification of extant trademark claims to include what they're claiming now, and I think that's a problem for them and it's a problem for me.

THE COURT: Well, I do as well. What I'm hearing now, the last statement from the podium, was it seemed to me a stepping away from the claim that the character of Mr. Money Bags himself constituted a common law trademark claim.

Did you not hear it the same way?

MR. GILL: I'm having a hard time articulating this.

I'm trying to be as polite about this as I can. And I have respect for Mr. Swanson. This isn't a personal dig.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: But I find that the language that the plaintiff uses in connection with these claims to be imprecise and very difficult for me to be able to identify what is at issue. I will say confidently I do not understand them to have clearly articulated that as a basis for the claim.

THE COURT: The summary judgment ruling will stand.

And to the extent that VGT is contending that the VGT common

I aw trademark claim includes the character of Mr. Money Bags

himself standing alone, that will not be permitted.

1 MR. GILL: And I understand that includes other 2 characters as well, Your Honor? 3 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 4 MR. GILL: Other characters are included in that ruling as well I understand? 5 6 THE COURT: I'm just addressing what they raised. 7 I'm not going beyond that here. Go ahead. 8 Oh, yes, Your Honor. I was actually MR. SWANSON: 9 going to stand up and just try to clarify even further that we 10 will not claim based on a character standing alone --11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 12 MR. SWANSON: Yes. 13 THE COURT: The next issue, VGT asserts that its 14 trade secret claims are not limited to three-reel mechanical 15 games. 16 I don't know that it's even necessary to invite comment 17 here. It seems absolutely clear to the court that in the 18 factual allegations of the amended complaint -- and I'm 19 referring to paragraphs 41 to 43 of the amended complaint --20 VGT refers to its "three-reel mechanical games." 21 Moreover, in the court's order on summary judgment at 22 docket 373, pages 43 and 44, the court held, I thought clearly, 23 that Castle Hill would be prejudiced if VGT were permitted to 24 expand its claim to five-reel games at this late date. 25 So I'm scratching my head and I'm wondering if this is

how law is practiced in other jurisdictions. But unless someone wants to clarify VGT's position, we'll move on to the next item.

MR. SWANSON: Your Honor, that would be me again.

So, Your Honor, we do recognize that the complaint does say that the trade secrets relate to three-reel mechanical games. However, from our earliest interrogatory response --

THE COURT: Look, I just read from your sixth interrogatory response, item 185-11. This was the sixth supplemental objections and responses. We're not operating under the sixth supplemental interrogatory responses. We're operating on the amended complaint and the court's order.

Anything else?

MR. SWANSON: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, to that very point, the court's order was clear on the specific trade secrets and confidential information at issue.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. SWANSON: And so as I understand the issue for trial, it's whether those -- I think it's ten -- if you count the trade secrets and know-how together, it's ten specific items of information. So the issue for trial is, is that information a trade secret or confidential and has it been misappropriated?

It seems to me like Castle Hill is trying to engraft

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this additional requirement where we also have to prove that the information relates to our three-reel mechanical games.

THE COURT: Oh, I see. Well, I mean, I suppose -- I mean, we're now getting into the theoretical. I mean, to the extent that these trade secrets might spill over, that's just the case; right? I mean, you've limited your trade secret claims to three-reel mechanical games, and it may very well be then that these trade secrets are used with respect to other games but that's not my focus here.

MR. SWANSON: Right, yes. And we just don't think it's necessary that we, you know, prove this additional element of our claims that they seem to be -- that we show that each of those ten items also relates to our three-reel mechanical games --

> THE COURT: Well, isn't that --

MR. SWANSON: -- as opposed to our games generally.

THE COURT: Isn't that part and parcel of your burden, though?

MR. SWANSON: I think it's our burden to show that each one is a trade secret or is confidential and has been misappropriated by the defendants. I don't --

THE COURT: Well, don't you also have to show that it's being used in connection with the three-reel mechanical games? I mean, it should be fairly simple to do, shouldn't it?

> MR. SWANSON: That it's being used, yes, in

connection with our games? I mean, yes, I do believe we can show that with respect to most, if not all, of them.

THE COURT: So does this have to do with the features that are not integrated into the Oklahoma Class II games?

MR. SWANSON: No, Your Honor. I think this is a separate issue.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm trying to understand because you're hedging in your language.

MR. SWANSON: Yeah. It just -- I mean, this came in at the eleventh hour in negotiating the pretrial order. I mean, given that we now have from Your Honor a very clear identification of the trade secrets and confidential information for trial, we view our burden at trial as just proving up that those are trade secrets or confidential information and that they've been misappropriated in connection with the defendants' games.

You know, I don't know that we have to show -- make some additional showing that we have used each trade secret in connection with our three-reel mechanical games specifically as opposed to Class II games more generally.

THE COURT: Can you give me an example of where that might be a problem?

MR. SWANSON: Yeah. For instance, Your Honor, one of the items of know-how -- well, you know, one that we've

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talked about a lot is the bingo card algorithm, which is certainly not specific to VGT's three-reel mechanical games. Another one in the items of know-how would be the QR code project, which again may not be specific to three-reel mechanical games.

THE COURT: I'm not suggesting that you might -that you would have to prove that it's specific to three-reel mechanical games. But are you saying that you might have difficulty showing that those trade secrets apply at all to any three-reel mechanical games?

I think on -- I think on a couple of MR. SWANSON: them, it's not clear that they would be related to three-reel mechanical games.

THE COURT: All right. Let me get them in front of me here.

0kay. Including QR code project? Or that's know-how. So what are we talking about?

MR. SWANSON: Yes, Your Honor. Yeah, for instance, in the know-how, like the use of the lease agreement would be an example of one that --

Well, but the use of the VGT THE COURT: I see. lease agreement is -- and, frankly, I think you've got an uphill climb there -- but that's going to apply, at least at this point, theoretically to three-reel mechanical games and others; correct?

MR. SWANSON: Yeah. Presumably it would, yes. Yes, Your Honor. So I think I understand what Your Honor is saying is as long as each one relates at least in part to three-reel

mechanical games --

THE COURT: Well, that would be my impression as I sit here. I mean, that's my surface impression.

Mr. Gill, your thoughts here?

MR. GILL: I'll have Mr. Antonelli address that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. ANTONELLI: Good afternoon again, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. ANTONELLI: I think -- I think I'm struggling a little bit to, again, understand exactly what VGT's position is. We think what they -- they crafted the language of the amended complaint, they wrote it, we didn't write it, and they said that the trade secrets were, quote, relating to the development and operation of the VGT three-reel mechanical games. So I'm not sure why they wouldn't need to demonstrate that the alleged trade secrets are -- is information related to their games.

I think one of the reasons that you're hearing counsel for VGT struggle with that is because, without getting too deep into the merits of some of these know-how claims, they know full that some of these things were just ideas that they never

example.

used and that the evidence will show are things that perhaps were discussed at some point at Castle Hill and quickly dismissed.

THE COURT: Right. Like the QR codes --

MR. ANTONELLI: Like the QR codes are a perfect

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ANTONELLI: Somebody at Castle Hill said, oh, we think that's a bad idea. Somebody told me at VGT that one of the lawyers said there were patents on that. That's the sum and substance of the QR code.

So I'm not sure why we're going to trial on that issue in the first place from VGT's perspective, but I think that's what they're struggling with on the -- you know, applying it to the three-reel mechanical games.

And, again, Your Honor, I think the -- they pled the complaint the way they pled the complaint and they specified that it were trade secrets relating to their development and operation of the VGT three-reel mechanical games. That's the way they articulated their claim, that's the claim that we're going to trial on, and we think that's the burden that they need to meet.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, it seems to me that that's not something that has to be decided here definitively. It would appear, though, that it was pled as a three-reel

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mechanical game matter and arguably, as we sit here right now, with respect to know-how, at least some of these could apply not only to three-reel mechanical games, but maybe five-reel mechanical games or five-reel video games or three-reel video games. But it seems to me that as long as it applies to -- that know-how applies to a three-reel mechanical game, then we'd need to be prepared to address it at trial; right?

MR. ANTONELLI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Great. Thank you very much.

The next issue is as to whether the VUTSA claim is

limited to the bingo card algorithm and uniqueness testing

algorithm in nondeployed machines. That's one that will keep

you on the edge of your seat, huh?

Just to give you the benefit of our thinking here, it appears that VGT's position is consistent with its position on summary judgment and with the PowerPoint provided by VGT during the dispositive motion hearing. I mean, it appears to us that the VUTSA claim is not limited to the bingo card algorithm and uniqueness testing algorithm in nondeployed machines.

So maybe I need to turn then to Castle Hill.

MR. ANTONELLI: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. I think what we struggled with when we were drafting the pretrial language on this particular issue was that VGT amended its complaint to add the Defend Trade Secrets Act claim and the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim.

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Specifically with respect to the -- what we refer to as the BMM code -- I know Your Honor is familiar with us using that nomenclature -- that has to do with a version of a bingo card generation algorithm that was submitted to BMM and was never deployed in the field. So the reason that VGT stated -when it amended its complaint, its stated reason for amending was that they didn't think that because that algorithm was never used in Oklahoma, or elsewhere, in commerce, they said that we don't think it's encompassed by our Oklahoma Uniform Trade Secrets Act claim. Therefore, they sought leave of court, which was granted, and they amended to add the Virginia Trade Secrets claim and the Defend Trade Secrets Act claim.

Our understanding all along has been that those claims related to the BMM code, which was the nondeployed bingo card generation algorithm, and an algorithm regarding uniqueness testing that was experimental code that was submitted to BMM and never deployed in the field and that those claims only related to those two issues.

And then for the first time in the -- when we were going back and forth on the pretrial, we heard oh, no, no, no, the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act applies to all of our know-how claims and it applies to the bingo card generation algorithm that you have in the field but the Oklahoma Uniform Trade Secrets Act also applies to that.

We're just struggling to try to understand exactly what

fits under which legal theory of recovery.

THE COURT: I'll confess that I'm struggling as well. Because I have plaintiff's motion for leave to file amended complaint here, docket No. 73, page 7 of 13, subsection (e), on page 7, and VGT says, "VGT's claim for trade secret misappropriation under Oklahoma law may not encompass defendants' misappropriation of VGT's bingo card generation

algorithm because defendants claim that they have not yet

deployed the misappropriated algorithm in Oklahoma."

-- which claim fits under -- which specific set of allegations

But it was our understanding that -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- that we have another algorithm that includes the uniqueness testing algorithm. I thought these two things were separate and apart, bingo card generation algorithm, uniqueness testing. And as I understand it, our position had to do with that lack of clarity.

So can you clarify this a bit?

MR. ANTONELLI: I can try.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ANTONELLI: So there are -- from Castle Hill's perspective, there are two bingo card generation algorithms. So on the one hand, there's what we'll refer to -- you'll hear us talk a lot at trial about the GUID-based approach. So the GUID algorithm, we distinguish that from the BMM code on the other hand. The uniqueness testing is actually -- it's -- it

is a separate algorithm but it needs to be considered kind of in the same breath with the bingo card generation. Because the end goal of what a Class II manufacturer is doing is they're trying to generate a bingo card and then demonstrate that that bingo card is unique from all other bingo cards. So --

THE COURT: Got it. All right. So I haven't completely wrapped my arms around that so you all need to make that clear to me. Because I had understood these were two separate but I can understand why those two functions have to be performed at the same time. Right?

MR. ANTONELLI: So the last time when we were here for the dispositive motions hearing, we talked a lot about the Mersenne Twister and ceding it with a 32-bit integer. That is all BMM code and that's the -- what we talk about being never deployed in the field, the experimental code. That's what we consider to fall under the Virginia Trade Secrets Act and Defend Trade Secrets Act claims because it was never deployed in the field.

So VGT says we do bingo card generation one single way, and you, Castle Hill, have misappropriated that trade secret through the BMM code and also through a completely separate and different way that you do bingo card generation with your deployed games. The way they generate the bingo card is different, the way they do uniqueness testing is different for the deployed games, the stuff in the field, what we would

only under Oklahoma Uniform Trade Secrets Act. That's a different algorithm and different approach from the BMM code, which is the Mersenne Twister-based algorithm. And VGT alleges that the two very different ways that Castle Hill has approached bingo card generation -- one deployed, one never deployed -- that both of those ways are a violation of its trade secret.

consider as falling under -- if it's in the case at all, coming

So, again, to kind of end where we started, the purpose of their amendment was to allege that the BMM code, never deployed, they say we learned about this in the course of discovery, we need to amend our complaint, because we don't think it falls under our existing claims. I don't read their amended complaint as saying, oh, by the way, all these know-how issues, those actually arise under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. That's not what they've alleged.

THE COURT: Well, it's very general.

MR. ANTONELLI: I agree. And it's, again, one of the reasons that we asked the court -- and I thought the court did do this -- in terms of narrowing and defining what trade secrets and know-how claims the plaintiff is going to be permitted to present at trial --

THE COURT: And I do that and you're not happy.

MR. ANTONELLI: Well, I was happy, Your Honor, until we got to the pretrial order drafting, and then I learned that

Secrets Act as well.

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THE COURT: All right.

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MR. ANTONELLI: that's the first I heard that.

So --

the know-how allegedly arises under the Virginia Uniform Trade

So I -- or, you know, other --

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. ANTONELLI: -- that's the struggle we're having.

Well, we need to resolve this here

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THE COURT:

today, folks. We need to know what we're going to go to trial

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on in 13 days.

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So VGT?

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MR. SWANSON: Yes, Your Honor. I think there's two

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i ssues. One is the scope of the VUTSA claim, one is the scope

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of the OUTSA claim.

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I appreciate that counsel never heard about our position that the VUTSA claim includes the know-how and all development work in Virginia. But we were very clear about this in our summary judgment opposition on page 42 in footnote 14, in which we said that because CHG's development work was coordinated from its headquarters in Virginia, the VUTSA claim encompasses both categories of misappropriation, both categories being the original development work that led to the deployed games and the subsequent BMM work. So they may not have read it but we said it, and I think Your Honor's summary judgment ruling recognized that and notes on pages 58 and 59

that the VUTSA claim covers both the bingo algorithm, the uniqueness testing algorithm, and the know-how. So that's point one.

THE COURT: All right. Give me just one second to take a look at this footnote in our order. Just one second.

MR. SWANSON: Really, it starts on page 41. We say that VGT's claims under the OUTSA, the VUTSA, and Oklahoma common law addressed Castle Hill's misappropriation of VGT's trade secrets and confidential business information in developing its Class II system in games that Castle Hill has placed in the field. And then at the end of that paragraph, we dropped a footnote explaining why the VUTSA covers that as well as the BMM software.

THE COURT: All right. Now, what about the argument about deployed and nondeployed games?

MR. SWANSON: With respect to the OUTSA claim, Your Honor, or the --

THE COURT: Well, right now I'm focused on Virginia.

MR. SWANSON: Oh, Virginia?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SWANSON: Yes. So, again, I think we were clear in our summary judgment opposition on this so they have heard about it before the pretrial order as point one.

Point two, the amended complaint clearly is not limited to the additional BMM development work. Specifically,

paragraph 152 of the amended complaint, Castle Hill has used one or more of the VGT trade secrets when developing games for Castle Hill, including the CHG-infringing games in Virginia. CHG has disclosed one or more of the VGT trade secrets in or from Virginia to third parties, including testing labs. So we didn't limit it just to the BMM claims.

And, Your Honor, I would just add, I mean, they're trying to hold us to every allegation in the amended complaints with respect to the definition of trade secrets and trademarks and trade dress. Well, it should work both ways.

THE COURT: No. It does seem to the court that VGT is correct here and it appears that these additional trade secrets may be pursued under VUTSA.

Now, what about -- I've got a reference to trade secrets 1 and 2 and 3 through 5. Are you taking the position that the other trade secrets do not apply under VUTSA?

MR. SWANSON: No. I think what we said is that all five apply to the VUTSA. I think the dispute on that one is the OUTSA. The question was whether trade secret No. 2, which is the uniqueness testing, whether that is part of the OUTSA.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm confused. I'm sorry.

So it would appear to the court that the plaintiff may proceed on the VUTSA claim and all five trade secrets there.

Just one second.

(Discussion held off the record)

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THE COURT: All right. The next issue is similarly confusing and perhaps more so. I'm looking at page 8 of the 3 proposed pretrial order, middle of the page, and VGT makes the 4 statement at the beginning of the second full paragraph here: 5 "Contrary to CHG's position, nothing in the complaint or 6 amended complaint excludes trade secret 2," which is uniqueness 7 testing," from the OUTSA claim." And we understand that to be 8 a reference to the BMM code which was not deployed in Oklahoma. 9 So, first of all, is that -- are we understanding that

correctly?

MR. SWANSON: That does relate to the code submitted to BMM, that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So how does that -- how does OUTSA apply if it wasn't deployed here in Oklahoma?

MR. SWANSON: So I think the issue from our perspective is, you know, that fact has not been proven yet and at -- you know, they didn't seek summary judgment to limit the scope of the OUTSA claim to exclude that trade secret.

What we have from discovery is that they submitted -they used that trade secret in connection with software that they had submitted to BMM, and at the time discovery closed they were still seeking approval of a bingo card method that we claim incorporates the uniqueness testing algorithm. not received updated discovery on that. We don't know whether they've gotten approval of that, whether they've deployed it,

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whether -- you know, what the status of that.

So if they want to -- if they want to prove at trial that they've not -- they've not done anything with the BMM code in Oklahoma, then that probably falls out at that point but let's see what the facts are at trial, I guess.

**THE COURT:** Don't you have the burden of proof? We do and we would ask their witnesses MR. SWANSON: But we think it's -- we think it is a fair issue for on that. trial given that they --

THE COURT: So you'd agree that they don't have to prove it? It's your --

Sure, sure. It's our burden to show MR. SWANSON: that, yeah, that code was used in Oklahoma, but I think we should be able to ask their witnesses about that. And if we have no proof, then we fail on that at trial. But if they had wanted to exclude that from trial, they could have sought summary judgment that we had no evidence and they haven't done that.

THE COURT: All right. And so it doesn't apply to this GUID code, it's clearly BMM code?

MR. SWANSON: With respect to the uniqueness testing, that's correct, Your Honor.

> THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SWANSON: Sorry. Just to be clear because I don't want --

THE COURT: 1 Mr. Luthey, are you clear on this? 2 MR. LUTHEY: Very, Your Honor. 3 MR. SWANSON: There are several permutations. We 4 will make this very clear at trial as to the timeline and the 5 permutations of the bingo card algorithm. 6 What I mentioned there, that at the close of discovery 7 they were trying to get approval of this new method, it does 8 include the GUID method but it also incorporated an aspect of 9 uniqueness testing. They kind of fused the two together. 10 THE COURT: See, that's where I'm unclear here. 11 MR. SWANSON: Yeah. 12 THE COURT: Can you maybe try to explain that to me 13 and how it falls out here in terms of the various claims --14 MR. SWANSON: Sure. 15 THE COURT: -- this merging together of these codes 16 or algorithms? 17 MR. SWANSON: So we have Castle Hill's original 18 algorithm which is the GUID. 19 THE COURT: Ri ght. 20 MR. SWANSON: That's the one that we know was 21 deployed or has been deployed in Oklahoma. We do claim that 22 that misappropriates the VGT bingo card algorithm. 23 Then once they received -- they tried to submit that 24 code to BMM. BMM said that that algorithm doesn't work based 25 on the way their system had it configured. That's when they

switched to what you've heard them call the Mersenne Twister approach and they tried to submit that to BMM. We claim that that also misappropriates the VGT bingo card algorithm and that's what they've said they've not deployed in Oklahoma.

But then once they withdrew that code from BMM, they then went on to a third algorithm in which they went back to the GUID approach, but then they incorporated an aspect of the uniqueness testing algorithm. We call it the "on-the-fly uniqueness check."

THE COURT: You call it what?

MR. SWANSON: "On-the-fly uniqueness check." It does a check for uniqueness kind of in realtime as we understand it.

And so that -- and that's where things stood at the end of discovery. We don't know if that, again, has been approved, if it's been deployed in Oklahoma. We have not received updated discovery on that.

THE COURT: What do they call this approach?

MR. SWANSON: The third approach? I don't know if

-- if I've heard them refer to it by any specific name.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Whack-A-Mole.

MR. ANTONELLI: I mean, Your Honor, we're again 13 days out from trial and I don't have the ability to put on a clean sheet of paper, you know, what their -- what their claim

is and what trade secrets specifically relate to it. Because it is confusing, and I understand why it's difficult for the court to grasp, when we're talking about bingo card generation and uniqueness testing and BMM and all these phrases that we throw around but we're talking about very different approaches. The three -- I mean, what counsel just said is that Castle Hill approached bingo card generation three completely different ways --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ANTONELLI: -- at different points in time, three different ways. But each --

THE COURT: And necessarily so because apparently it didn't pass muster the very first two times. Is that correct?

MR. ANTONELLI: The code that was originally deployed in the field passed muster with one regulatory -- or one --

THE COURT: I stand corrected.

MR. ANTONELLI: -- testing lab.

THE COURT: You're right.

MR. ANTONELLI: There was a second testing lab that they subsequently submitted that algorithm to. They raised some issues. That was when the BMM -- what I call the "BMM code" was submitted. That code was ultimately withdrawn.

The way the BMM code did bingo card generation and uniqueness testing was different from the way they did it in

the deployed code and different from the bingo card generation approach and uniqueness testing approach that was then submitted to BMM. So they're all different but I guess VGT is going to prove at trial that they all violate their same trade secret.

Again, it's confusing to me as to is the uniqueness testing just Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets or is it Oklahoma? Counsel saying the fact hasn't been proven. They say they don't have any evidence of it. So that was something I was struggling with understanding how to respond to that. But, I mean, I guess we'll see what the testimony at trial is.

THE COURT: I think at this point we have to, given that it wasn't resolved at summary judgment, just on a procedural basis.

MR. ANTONELLI: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ANTONELLI: One final issue that I want to raise as we're talking about the trade secrets is the Defend Trade Secrets Act claim and understanding exactly what that applies to.

Again, we understood that the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which was enacted after -- plaintiff amended their complaint because the Defend Trade Secrets Act wasn't enacted when our games that they say misappropriate their trade secrets were actually originally deployed in the fold, that that claim --

1 has done this three different ways. So which one?

THE COURT: Well, your response is basically where we were left. We're not clear as to which algorithm we're talking about. So let's see if we can nail this down.

MR. SWANSON: Sure. With respect to the OUTSA claim, what we're talking about is the original bingo card algorithm primarily. And then, as we've just been talking about, again if the evidence in trial shows that any of these -- the second or third algorithm has actually been approved and deployed in Oklahoma, then presumably that would be a violation of --

THE COURT: Well, but he's admitting here that the second one was withdrawn; correct?

MR. SWANSON: Yes. That's what they've said, yeah.

THE COURT: So --

MR. SWANSON: So it may just be an issue with respect to the third one.

THE COURT: Is that --

MR. ANTONELLI: I don't -- I don't understand there to be an allegation in the amended complaint about a third algorithm. So we had the deployed code -- the originally deployed code and we had the BMM code. Those were the two algorithms that were at issue. So now we're talking about -- I agree that Castle Hill has approached this a third way but that is -- I'm not sure where that is in the amended complaint.

THE COURT: All right. Let me quickly try to find this in the amended complaint.

MR. SWANSON: Okay. I don't think the amended complaint is specific to certain algorithms. We did put -- in our summary judgment papers, again, and in the expert declaration submitted in opposition to their summary judgment motion, we did talk about the third algorithm.

THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at your presentation from the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and you say -- this is the Oklahoma Uniform Trade Secrets Act -- and you say "bingo card algorithm."

MR. SWANSON: Correct.

THE COURT: Now, you say you're talking about the original bingo card algorithm? Have we used an acronym for that?

MR. SWANSON: The GUID approach is --

THE COURT: Okay. So I've got, as you could say, GUID right there. So you're seeking as to GUID, which is the original, and now you're seeking with regard to this alleged third approach?

MR. SWANSON: Yes.

THE COURT: But you don't have any evidence of that?

MR. SWANSON: Again, at the end of discovery the way
things stood -- this was about a year ago -- they were trying
to get approval of this third approach. We haven't gotten

1 updated information from them on whether they have gotten 2 approval, whether it's been deployed in Oklahoma, if they have. 3 THE COURT: Well, but you don't have any evidence 4 that it --5 MR. SWANSON: And they didn't seek summary judgment 6 on --7 **THE COURT:** -- that it infringes your trade secret. We do, Your Honor. 8 MR. SWANSON: No. In opposition 9 to their summary judgment motion in Mr. Friedman's declaration, 10 he says in paragraph 32, "I understand that after CHG withdrew 11 its bingo algorithm that relied on the exhaustive uniqueness 12 check" -- that's the second one -- "CHG developed a new 13 algorithm that developed a 'on the fly' or realtime uniqueness 14 check." 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. SWANSON: Skipping ahead to the next paragraph, 17 "Castle Hill's on-the-fly method uses the same bingo card 18 compression scheme as the prior exhaustive uniqueness testing 19 approach by compressing each cell to just four bits, and like 20 VGT's uniqueness testing algorithm, the compressed values 21 enable the entire bingo card" -- and it goes on with the 22 details. 23 THE COURT: Okay. You're refreshing my 24 recollection. That's exactly what he says there.

Yeah.

So --

MR. SWANSON:

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THE COURT: So for purposes of the pursuit of justice here, to prevent the need for another lawsuit relative to the additional algorithm here, and to try to get it wrapped up, to the extent that we can, in one lawsuit, we'll allow it to proceed with regard to that, and particularly in view of -- is it Dr. Friedman? I've forgotten.

MR. SWANSON: Mr. Friedman.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Friedman's statement contained in the response to the motion for summary judgment.

MR. SWANSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Or was it in the response or is it -- it was the response.

MR. SWANSON: Response, yeah.

THE COURT: Right. All right. Next, I need to know how many days does plaintiff anticipate needing for its portion of the trial which would obviously include cross-examination by defendant?

MR. RUBMAN: Your Honor, consistent with -- sorry -- Your Honor, our view continues to be that we expect to wrap up our case in five days, assuming reasonable crosses and no real surprises, but we've been on track for five days.

THE COURT: All right. Now, as I hope you can appreciate, having waded through a lot of these depositions and having had a few nonjury trials before, I know attorneys, particularly for purposes of possible appeal, like to dump just

as much onto a trial court as possible and ask to admit these various depositions for consideration. It's not very realistic, particularly given the condition of some of these depositions. I mean, there have been a lot of designations of irrelevant material. Just going through these, I see broad swaths of these depositions that don't contain objections to portions that have been designated, and I scratch my head as to how these could possibly be -- this testimony could possibly be relevant.

Not having the technical expertise, as some of you do,
I've been, I think, a little generous in terms of relevance
objections. Because if I think some of this testimony may well
be relevant, I've allowed it, but I think it's important for
you all to whittle this down as succinctly as you possibly can.

So to the extent that you wish to submit deposition testimony at trial, it needs to be presented during the course of the trial or whittled down to the extent that I can read it, you know, after the end of the day so I can try to absorb this information. Because this certainly is not the type of information or the area in which I've been trained. I'm doing the best I can. But, you know, I'm hearing some concepts here today that I've not heard even before in this lawsuit.

MR. RUBMAN: Right. Understood.

THE COURT: So fortunately not very many.

MR. RUBMAN: Yeah.

THE COURT: But I think it's important that you all distill and edit, and the depositions that have been submitted for ruling on objections have very clearly not been distilled very well.

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So what other issues do I need to address here?

MR. RUBMAN: Well, on that point, Your Honor, I do

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appreciate you raising it. And speaking for VGT, we are in the

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process of narrowing ours down. We did a runtime, if you take

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all those original depositions, how much time it would take.

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And, you know, Castle Hill had 38 hours and we had 21 hours,

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neither of which is realistic.

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THE COURT: Yeah. I spent a good time this vacation weekend trying to digest some of the objections. And, frankly, this is the first time I've ever had to try to rule on a 14-page swath of a deposition and try to pick out the objectionable portions of those 14 pages from multiple objections listed only by a letter. I mean, it's virtually -well, it's difficult to do.

> MR. RUBMAN: Yeah.

THE COURT: I have to hunt for the question amongst the 14 pages that supposedly contains hearsay. I remember vividly one last night at about midnight after going through about 16 pages of deposition on a hearsay objection, and the last, you know, four lines of those 16 pages had the question that was calling for hearsay. Well, I mean, you know, that's

just not good legal work, frankly. And I don't know whether you had a paralegal do that or what. But you shouldn't call upon a federal judge, who's trying to deal with criminal matters and other matters, to try to hunt for some objectionable testimony in a broad swath of pages in a deposition.

MR. RUBMAN: Your Honor, we certainly understand that. It was a challenging exercise in part because -- I think you're referring now to Castle Hill's designations and our objections to them?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RUBMAN: And there were lots of them that were 10 to 12 pages and we certainly understand the challenge there.

What I'm expecting will happen is all of those designations were done prior to your rulings. They also were done prior to the parties doing objections on exhibits and all that. What we are doing, in light of those rulings, is cutting down ours in light of the rulings which I think will eliminate some. Also, in light of hopeful some issues about documents where there's no dispute over authentication, for example. You probably saw lots of that stuff in there, much more so in ours. I think ours were quite a bit more fine-tuned or narrow. So that process is underway.

We certainly respect your time and we're not planning to overburden you with unnecessary designations. They're as

painful for us as they are for you. Maybe they're more painful for you than for us. But we certainly expect to be very narrow on that.

There was one --

THE COURT: I'm sure you can appreciate there lots of duplication in these depositions.

MR. RUBMAN: There is.

THE COURT: And you can tell the depositions that were taken early on when you and opposing counsel were trying to understand the facts.

MR. RUBMAN: Sure.

THE COURT: And then you obviously get better as time goes on. But there's a lot of duplication in these things.

MR. RUBMAN: Yeah. Can I raise one specific issue relating to the depositions?

One thing that we have been struggling with, in terms of preparing for trial and to do it in an efficient way, is how to deal with their counter-designations to ours because they never line them up. And one specific example that we think is particularly acute, because we want to play Mr. Yarborough's testimony in our case in chief, we designated -- this is one where both sides designated in the first instance and then both sides did counters to the other side's designations. We designated 37 minutes. They responded by counter-designating

Now, in our case in chief, we want to play his testimony. But to play it with their two hours of designations, which don't match up, we don't quite know how to do that and we're seeking guidance. Our preference would be just to play ours because they want to play theirs separately and they can just play theirs in their case as long as it doesn't overlap. Given it's a witness that's been designated by both sides, that seems fair.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RUBMAN: There's no lack of completeness because they can play in theirs their two hours, if they ultimately decide that that's how they want to spend their time. But if we can get a little assistance and guidance on that, that would be helpful to us.

THE COURT: Well, that's a fair way to do it.

Because obviously if a party overdesignates, then they have to suffer the eye rolls from the finder of fact.

Yarborough is an interesting guy; right?

MR. RUBMAN: He's an -- sorry.

THE COURT: He's interesting.

MR. RUBMAN: Interesting, yes.

THE COURT: Yeah. Or I could employ the old Thomas R. Brett method, you get equal time, you know. If you take 37 minutes, you get 37 minutes which, I think, has been upheld by

So let me hear from the other side here.

MR. PLATT: Thank you, Your Honor. Henry Platt.

Just as a preliminary point on Mr. Yarborough, both sides have designated him. We've designated him on the theory that Mr. Yarborough, who lives in Memphis, or somewhere in Tennessee, near Nashville will be unavailable. Covington & Burling represents Mr. Yarborough. They represented him at the -- at the deposition. If he's not available, it's because they're not making him available, okay? Maybe he doesn't want to come. Maybe -- they have an obligation to make a reasonable effort to bring their witness here.

We have asked them. They have not responded to our six e-mails on this issue, okay? So they have the burden of establishing that he's unavailable. If he's not unavailable to them and he's unavailable to us, we should be able to play our -- or have Your Honor read -- and we don't want to waste everybody's time showing a video -- his deposition.

THE COURT: Well, what I'm telling you is, you need to whittle it down --

MR. PLATT: I understand that.

THE COURT: -- and not waste my time either way.

MR. PLATT: I agree with that 100 percent, Your Honor. But the idea that, you know, ours is just a counter-designation to their designation is a little

frustrating to us. Because, as I said, they haven't responded to our request of whether or not they're actually going to make him available.

I am sure that when he sold his company --

THE COURT: Well, he wants to utilize the taxpayer-funded services of the federal courts but doesn't want to show up to testify.

MR. PLATT: Yes, Your Honor. He was paid one and a half billion dollars for his company. I was told that many times by him.

THE COURT: It's Australian money.

MR. PLATT: I can assure Your Honor that there's an agreement with VGT that he will make himself available for reasonable litigation issues, okay? We've asked them if that's the fact; we haven't gotten a response. That's all I'd like to say on that.

And yes, we also will be whittling down our deposition designations now that we have an agreement on which, as we understand, they are definitely calling as witnesses. Certain people obviously we don't have to waste the court's time with since they've now finally agreed that they're going to bring them in, like Mr. Sevigny, for example.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. RUBMAN: Your Honor, I know you want to get this resolved. A few points.

1 We've told them several times that Mr. Yarborough is 2 unavai I abl e. We tried. We would desperately like 3 Mr. Yarborough here. We've tried. We've had others reach out 4 We've reached out to him directly, to his assistant. to him. 5 He's not at the company anymore; we can't force him to be here. 6 If we could, we would because we want him here. And we've told 7 them already -- I don't understand how he could say that we 8 haven't told them because we have. So I'll just -- I don't 9 know that we need to debate that, but we certainly made our 10 effort because we would love for him to be sitting in that 11 stand. 12 THE COURT: My understanding he's essentially just a 13 stockholder now; right? 14 15 16

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MR. RUBMAN: I think he testified that he does own some stock, if I remember. I believe that's right. Or at I east he did back then. I don't know. I haven't spoken to him since the deposition other than trying to reach out to contact him to agree to be here. So we are as frustrated as they are on that one, I can assure you.

THE COURT: Franklin, Tennessee, is that where he is or --

MR. RUBMAN: I know that he at least had a home there. I think he also spends a lot of time, he told me, in Florida. But I don't know where he is.

THE COURT: Well, of course. There's no personal

MR. RUBMAN: I don't know what motivates him. But this is something that we certainly wanted him to be here.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me just probe a little bit of defense counsel.

I haven't really looked at your designations in this light. Are you saying that there's so much rich content here that you need to broadcast two hours of Mr. Yarborough's testimony to me?

MR. GILL: Let me address that, Your Honor.

I think it's fair to say that, based on the fact that the case has been narrowed somewhat from the summary judgment rulings, that we have already determined internally to make a serious effort at cutting down our deposition designations.

Obviously, that's a case-by-case decision. And with

Mr. Yarborough, who obviously was an important -- he was the top guy at VGT, he is not available to testify at trial, the ability to narrow his testimony may be more difficult than our ability to narrow some other testimony.

What we may find, too, is that -- at least for the defense case -- you may find that once a witness has taken the stand, even if it's a representative of a party as an officer, once we've been able to go through the exercise of direct and cross-examination, some of the prior designations may then be mooted. So it may be that, you know, some of that material may

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fall away as the trial progresses.

And if the court please, I do have a few items of my own relating to the conduct of the trial that I wouldn't mind raising with the court.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's deal with this first,

MR. GILL: Sure.

THE COURT: It would seem to me that to the extent that designations from the defense are such as described here with Mr. Yarborough, it would seem to me that I'm going to require the defendants to present that testimony in the defense of the case. I think we can put those two pieces together to -- there won't be so much time between the two that I can't understand the full context there. So, I mean, if it's 37 minutes versus two hours, you need to present that during your portion of the case.

MR. GILL: I understand, Judge.

THE COURT: Right. And if it's equal, we'll just hear it all together. It makes it a little easier.

> MR. GILL: 0kay.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, your housekeeping matters?

MR. GILL: Well, I have a few, Your Honor, if the court please.

**THE COURT:** Oh, we need to take a break.

MR. GILL: Sure.

THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess.

(Short break)

THE COURT: Just one topic I'll bring back up.

Although I've watched a good deal of gaming now on the Internet, you know, most of this is videotaped by people who are hooked on it and they're more interested in seeing the reels spinning than they are on the actual bingo table. Frankly, the thing that intrigues me is the fact that this is really bingo and I'd be interested in looking at the bingo card. You know, as you've told me over and over, this is a facade.

I did happen to look at the gaming compact over the weekend to see the 4, 5, and 6 percent versus the 10 percent.

I know now why we're here, by the way.

MR. GILL: That's right.

THE COURT: As Mr. Luthey smiles.

So one of the other things I get to read about -- and it probably is no surprise that I'm not a denizen of casinos -- that I read about how you can feel these mechanical bells even across the casino floor, but you all haven't believed it important enough that I actually experience that. I don't even know how these strobes actually light up because, as I say, most of the videos are these guys who love to focus on the facade, you know, the reels spinning, you know, talking about how, oh, I'm going to try my left hand now instead of my right

1 hand because that will give me a whole lot more luck. My gosh, 2 what are we doing to our people here? 3 But in any event, it fills everyone's pockets. So go 4 ahead. Well, actually responding to some 5 MR. GILL: Ri aht. 6 of Your Honor's remarks, when we were here for a status 7 conference before you back in November, it was certainly my 8 understanding at that conference that you had expressed some 9 reluctance about personally visiting a casino. 10 THE COURT: That I had? 11 MR. GILL: That you had. And you had inquired of 12 the parties to try to think about a way to try to bring the 13 casino experience in your courtroom, which I think was the 14 genesis for both parties to get --15 THE COURT: Oh, I was told the casinos didn't want 16 me. 17 MR. GILL: Okay. 18 THE COURT: No. That was communicated to me, that 19 they didn't want to have anything to do with this. 20 MR. GILL: Got it. 21 THE COURT: They wanted me to stay a mile away. 22 MR. GILL: All right. 23 THE COURT: And did not -- because they don't want 24 to throw themselves in the middle here.

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MR. GILL:

Right.

THE COURT: They like competition.

MR. GILL: I'm sure they do.

THE COURT: So --

MR. GILL: But I think Your Honor had said to us, for whatever reason, that you were reluctant to go experience this yourself in a casino and could we figure out a way to try to bring that experience to you in the courtroom. And one thing that both sides have done is we have taken photographs of not only the plaintiff's machines and the defendants' machines, but other competitor machines and we've also done videos. That's why those are, you know, on the parties' exhibit lists, to be able to try to show you, to the extent we can --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GILL: -- what this looks like. We can't make it 100 percent like, you know, could you hear the deafening bell in here like you could if you were standing next to one in a casino? No, we can't do that for you. But we have made an effort to try to bring the, you know, visual imagery to you and to do it in a way that we hope would be useful for you.

THE COURT: Well, maybe that's what the record reflects. I don't recall it that way.

But in any event, I did have -- I sat next to a guy who is head of security at one of these big casinos here in town on an airplane and he's invited me out to see the security. Now, I've been out there once before but he claims it's been greatly

upgraded since then and had invited me to come out.

If there's no objection -- and I won't even say which casino it is -- if there is objection, I won't do it.

MR. GILL: Let me caucus with my team and perhaps we should -- the parties should caucus together. I think certainly for -- it's less of a concern for the trademark-related claims. For the trade dress claims, I think the law is pretty clear that Your Honor needs to consider the plaintiff's product, obviously as well as the defendants' products, but also other relevant competitors so you understand what the marketplace is like. The different marketplaces are different so you find different compositions or different machines in different casinos.

So for us that may be fine for you as long as we're sure that you're going to be able to see not only the plaintiff's machines and our machines --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: -- because the case law makes it very plain it would be error to decide the case just based on that. You've got to also look at the full panoply of the marketplace. As long as we know that you have the ability to go to the right destination and see that and experience that, that may be fine, okay?

MR. RUBMAN: Your Honor, we have no objection. It would be great, if you could do that.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I do think it's something that you need to talk to your clients about, because I would share the same concerns that Mr. Gill does, and not as a lawyer to personally give my go-ahead. Because as he states, this is multi-faceted and you need to make sure that I decide this on all of the factors rather than just a few. It's difficult to control when a federal judge is just wandering about.

I did happen years ago to go through the Cherokee

Casi no long ago. I wasn't focused on the games. I was mainly

focused on all the elderly people pulling their oxygen behind

them as they're going from game to game plugging the machines

which I found to be very depressing. But --

MR. GILL: And probably smoking cigarettes at the same time.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GILL: Right. Well, we appreciate Your Honor giving us that thought and we will caucus as a group and give you a response.

There are some additional issues. To the extent Your Honor doesn't have anything else you want to raise with us, I have some issues I wouldn't mind raising with Your Honor, if now is a good time.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. GILL: All right. First of all, one of those

is, do you want or will you accept opening statements from the parties? Without being presumptive and speaking for the plaintiff, it is our view for the defendants that you are as prepared and knowledgeable at this point in the case, having ruled on a lot of motions and reviewed a lot, that we really don't feel like an opening statement is necessary in this case and we begin trial and we're ready to start with the presentation of evidence. That being said, obviously we're mindful of the fact this is your courtroom and we'll give you whatever you want and you feel like is helpful.

THE COURT: I do think here, given the many claims -- relatively many claims here, that if you can distill -- it's possible for the plaintiffs, for instance, to distill their claims and say, this is what we're asking for and this is our focus, and the defense to respond, you know, these are our defenses, I do think it would be helpful.

MR. GILL: Okay. Do you -- I'm guessing you're going to want to impose some sort of limit on that as well? Have you thought about what limit you would like the parties to use in terms of an opening?

THE COURT: Well, my suitemate in state court used to say, "The United States Supreme Court allots 30 minutes per side on the most important cases in the country and this ain't one of them." So I would say 30 minutes per side would be fine.

MR. GILL: Very good. And on the flip side of that, 1 2 when this trial is over, I understand you're going to be 3 wanting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from 4 the parties --5 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 6 MR. GILL: -- and there may be legal briefing in 7 support of that as well? 8 THE COURT: Correct. 9 MR. GILL: I'm guessing at that point you don't need 10 a closing argument because we'll be submitting extensive 11 written materials; is that correct? 12 Correct. Now, obviously I would expect THE COURT: 13 Rule 50 motions. 14 MR. GILL: Yes, sir. 15 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 16 MR. GILL: Yes, sir. We'll be prepared to do that, 17 no question. 18 THE COURT: Ri ght. Because there very well may be 19 opportunities to reduce certain of the claims. You know, we've 20 discussed them today --21 MR. GILL: Ri ght. 22 THE COURT: -- you know, some of these know-how 23 claims. 24 MR. GILL: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. And we're mindful

of the fact that we're not trying to try the case -- pretry the

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case today necessarily. We just want to know what's -- you know, what the rules are --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: -- when we show up here on the 16th.

With regard to the rule on witnesses, what's the rule with respect to experts? Our view is that it's helpful in some circumstances for experts to be able to see the testimony that's coming in from the fact witnesses; or if not that, to have the ability to review a transcript. Those are things that are verboten for fact witnesses when the rule is invoked so we want to raise that with you as well.

THE COURT: That's always been my approach.

MR. GILL: All right.

THE COURT: Now, how does that interact with the confidentiality?

MR. GILL: Well, the experts are covered under the protective order and have the ability to receive and review information on the protective order so I don't think the protective order is implicated by that at all.

THE COURT: All right. I just wanted to make sure all of the experts were covered here, all right?

MR. GILL: Right. With respect to the order of proof, I've seen this obviously done a couple of different ways. It depends sometimes if it's a jury trial or a bench trial. It does affect the Rule 50 analysis; that is, does the

scope of cross-examination, is it limited to the scope of direct; or do you want us to rather put on a witness and have that witness testify one time and be done?

That affects, for example, my planning a little bit logistically. I have been asked by the plaintiff to produce a couple of witnesses for them to be able to examine those witnesses in their case in chief. To be candid, I feel like it's my obligation to produce for them witnesses that I plan on calling in my case so they can call them in their case, if they wish.

If I have to -- and none of my witnesses are local. So if I have to fly those witnesses here twice, that presents an extra challenge for me; or if I have to have the witness fly here and remain here for an extended period, that's an issue for me as well.

THE COURT: Right. Well, typically lawyers in this community permit more expansive examination of witnesses who are outside -- from outside the jurisdiction --

MR. GILL: Right.

THE COURT: -- to accommodate them, their schedule, and the cost to the parties.

Now, that may affect Mr. Rubman's estimate of five days. And, you know, I've had judges -- I've never had to do this -- have a stopwatch on an attorney. But that would be my general approach. I think it's more reasonable to accommodate

those witnesses to allow you to go beyond the scope of direct.

MR. GILL: Right. I think it is too. And let me volunteer that where I have had that experience, to be able to cross-examine a witnesses in a more fulsome matter and not be limited to scope of direct, sometimes that eliminates the need for me to call that witness in my case at all.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: And so that shortens my case. So it may lengthen the plaintiff's case on the front end and it lengthens the defense case on the back end but I think it's a zero-sum game. I don't think doing it that way adds any time to the trial at all. I think as a practical matter it probably shortens it.

THE COURT: I think it could lengthen it. It's not been my experience that that occurs.

MR. GILL: Right. So --

THE COURT: Any view from plaintiff?

MR. SWANSON: We're fine with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GILL: All right. Thank you, Judge.

The parties received an e-mail from your clerk,

Ms. Perkins, who obviously is in charge of keeping the trains

running on time here, and asked the parties to submit three

copies of all the exhibits in this case. That's something I

wanted to raise with you, too, because we have so many and some

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of them -- some individual exhibits are extremely lengthy. So there's some here that are more than a thousand pages for just one exhibit.

I was wondering if we could perhaps relax the rule a bit here. I believe counsel is in agreement with that. That each side would produce obviously one hard copy of everything for you, you've got that for your record. But if we're going to have multiple copies of this record, it is going to be extremely voluminous and bulky and take up more of your real estate.

THE COURT: The first problem that jumps to mind is that if there's only the original, which we normally allow you then to -- we turn back to you, then we have nothing to refer to.

So you're suggesting one original that the witness would see, but then do I have an opportunity to make notes? I mean, that would make it very difficult for me to --

MR. GILL: I understand.

THE COURT: -- say, give me that, reach over to the witness stand and take it and make notes on it, highlight it, that sort of thing.

MR. GILL: Sure, sure.

THE COURT: Well, unless you can provide it to the witness electronically.

MR. GILL: Well, that's actually exactly where I was

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GILL: It is our intention to present most, if not all, of our evidence in an electronic form. I understand you need at least one hard copy for purposes of your record and purposes of maintaining a record for purposes of any appeal but I prefer the electronic presentation. I think it's easier, I think it takes less time, I think it's more impactful than just a regular paper presentation, and that may reduce the need to have multiple paper copies of what is a voluminous record.

THE COURT: Well, that would at least reduce one copy.

MR. GILL: Sure.

THE COURT: The other problem, though, is if we need to have one copy for purposes of appeal --

MR. GILL: Sure.

THE COURT: -- then I can't mark on that copy.

MR. GILL: Sure so you want a working copy you can markup, et cetera?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. GILL: Okay. Well, we're happy to do that.

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. RUBMAN: I'm glad we're trying to work through this issue. One idea that we wanted to suggest is we will give

you a full set of paper so you have one full set of everything, if you want it. For each witness that we are going to call, whether on direct or doing our cross, we will bring a witness binder that has the exhibits most likely to be used. We will give you a copy, we'll give the witness a copy, and we can give the clerk a copy so you can take your notes in that binder. It will be called the Sevigny direct binder, presumably they would bring a Sevigny cross binder, and that's something you could keep and take whatever notes you want. The witness would have it. The witness would also see the exhibits show up on the monitor that we'll have a tech person here.

And then at the end of the trial, or whenever you want, we would also suggest that we give to the court an electronic copy of everything that was admitted. So we'll give you a CD-ROM or a drive that has every exhibit that's been admitted so you --

THE COURT: Searchable?

MR. RUBMAN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Searchable?

MR. RUBMAN: Searchable. It would be on there by exhibit number. But that would mean you would have one full hard copy, if you still want it. You would get the binders from -- a copy of the binder that's given to the witness that should have most, if not all, of the exhibits they're using. Then you would also get an electronic set of the exhibits that

THE COURT: So you're proposing having hard copies in notebooks for the witness and the court and the record? So you're proposing having three actual hard copies, plus an electronic copy after trial?

MR. RUBMAN: Yes. And if you wanted a full hard-copy set, we could do that. I would recommend for any extra-long documents, maybe things above 25 pages or whatever, we just put in the first 25 pages and then supplement it, if we actually use that exhibit later, just to save a few trees here and some space. But that's up to you. There are some long exhibits, some of which won't get used. I know the parties, as often happens, tend to put more on the exhibit list than they'll ultimately use.

THE COURT: Correct. Let me counsel here.

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: Don't say this old dog ain't willing to learn new tricks. I'm willing to just go electronic entirely. Can we then instead of having separate notebooks for each witness, just present it to the witnesses electronically? I'll take extensive notes and note the exhibits and we'll just search the electronic database after trial.

MR. RUBMAN: We're happy to try that. It does tend to lead to some more leading questions if we have to point -- if we have to tell the hot-seat guy what page to show on the

witness doesn't have a physical document to flip through.

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But assuming there's -- this is a bench trial.

assume we're going to be a little flexible on our pointing them to the right parts of the document. I mean, in that case the

> THE COURT: Ri ght.

MR. RUBMAN: So it just -- I mean, would you allow us to give a binder, if we want, if we think that will make it go faster?

THE COURT: If you'd like to. I mean, Mr. Gill, your thoughts?

MR. GILL: Well, my only concern is that, I mean, the plaintiff had originally listed 1,080 exhibits. So if we don't get a copy of whatever that binder is they're giving the witness, then we're scrambling to get access to whatever documents there are.

So in theory, it sounds like a good idea but I don't want to be having to spend time when I should be paying attention to what the witness is testifying to looking for whatever the appropriate document is.

THE COURT: All right. So maybe I misunderstood your proposal. Under your proposal, you would not present a copy for the court, but you'd demand one from the plaintiff's attorney?

MR. GILL: Well, if we're going electronically and there's no binders, then everybody sees it at the same time,

THE COURT: Okay. I thought you were professing difficulties with that approach.

MR. GILL: So if that's what you're doing, if we're just, you know, displaying the documents electronically to Your Honor and the witness and all counsel at the same time, I think that's fine.

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: Let's try to go all electronic.

MR. GILL: Okay. Very good. Then we will do that.

With regard to the protective order, I mean, obviously we have a protective order in this case that addresses both confidential and highly confidential information. I don't know -- the order suggests that Your Honor will address issues regarding presentation of evidence that's affected by that order at trial. I don't know how that is or what -- you know, what sort of protocol Your Honor wants to put in place for this. But a related issue is, is the courtroom going to be sealed?

THE COURT: Specifically, what are you concerned about with regard to confidential and --

MR. GILL: Well, obviously certain discovery material has been designated by the parties under the protective order. And, you know, with regard to presentation of evidence in the courtroom, ordinarily if I'm representing a

corporate client, I'm going to have a corporate representative

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present in the courtroom.

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THE COURT

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THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: The corporate representative is going to be present in the courtroom when there's testimony of highly confidential and confidential documents being flashed on the screen. Seems to me that's just inherent in the nature of having a trial in a case like this; correct?

THE COURT: Sorry. I didn't pick up on that obvious point with your first mention.

MR. GILL: Right.

THE COURT: Mr. Rubman, your thoughts?

MR. RUBMAN: If the question is whether the courtroom should be sealed at times, I think the answer's yes. There are going to be sensitive trade secrets and confidential information on both sides disclosed --

THE COURT: But exclusion of corporate representatives?

MR. RUBMAN: Yeah, that's what I was going to get

If that is a separate issue, I think it depends somewhat on who that corporate representative is. I know there's already been issues that you've ruled on with respect to Mr. Watson and, you know, I think the same concerns that we express there would apply. I don't know who the witness would

be -- or who the corporate representative would be but we do

have concerns.

Our corporate repr

Our corporate representative, the person we would

submit to go through it, would be the general counsel so we think there's less of a concern from a business side. We're

doing that partly to address this issue to not make it as

acute. But I think in that sense, it will depend on who it is.

THE COURT: So would your proposal be then that we just go step by step with regard to, say, particular witnesses or particular documents, and then you would approach -- or ask that the courtroom be sealed and certain individuals excluded during that portion of the trial?

MR. RUBMAN: I reluctantly say yes. I think that both sides will have to be careful and sensitive to the need for there to be an open courtroom, but there are things where I think we would -- our position should be that it should be sealed. I think there's a lot of internal back and forth and documents and I'm less concerned about some of the e-mails. But when we start getting really about trade secrets and confidential business information, we would request that the courtroom be sealed.

We can -- we can try to put all of that together for a certain -- like if a witness is going to testify on -- like Stacy Friedman is going to testify about trade secrets and trade dress issues and trademark issues -- I guess mostly trade

dress issues -- we would do our best to keep the trade secrets apart so we can allow the corporate representative to see as much as possible.

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THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. RUBMAN: But that would be our view.

Ri ght.

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THE COURT: Mr. Gill, your thought as to that

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approach?

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MR. GILL: Well, my thought is that as the defendant in a trade secret action where it has been difficult at times

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to figure out exactly what the nature is of the claims, I would

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object to that. I think my client has an absolute right to be

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present in the courtroom at all times and see the evidence

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that's being unfolded against them and to be able to advise me

I've been in a position where during the duration of

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how to respond to some of it.

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this case, I have been prohibited and we have strictly complied

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with those requirements under the protective order to not share

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highly confidential information to our client. But when time

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comes for trial, I need to be able to communicate with my

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client about the claims and how to refute those claims and I

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need somebody in the courtroom for the duration of the trial.

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So I object to that.

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And I also would note that the Tenth Circuit law on

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this issue takes a certain position with respect to judicial

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records, and obviously the record of the conduct of this trial

is a judicial record within the meaning of the cases. I had cited this Tenth Circuit case in my motion for relief under the protective order to obtain consent to show certain highly confidential information to limited Castle Hill personnel, and it seems to me that's implicated about this as well.

I think it's a thorny issue. I have had a trade secrets trial in the Eastern District of Virginia where the district court just flat refused to seal the courtroom and said that that's one of the risks of a trial in this case. But there's no question my client has an absolute right to be present for that and I strongly object to any suggestion that they don't.

THE COURT: You mean there's a constitution?

MR. GILL: Yes, there is. And I also want to say -- and, again, I think I understand where the plaintiff is going in terms of its selection of its corporate representative. On the one hand, I think the plaintiff has the right to choose who its corporate representative is. Castle Hill also has some sensitive information that we've produced in discovery in this case. It includes, but is not limited to, financial data. And if it includes Mr. Dunn, who is not only general counsel, but also functions in a business role, as I understand it, based on the settlement conversation we had in Oklahoma City, I have concerns about him being able to hear some of that information. But, again, we may not be able to control that when we're here

for the trial. But that's something I didn't think we should be addressing for the first time on the 16th.

THE COURT: I think you're exactly right. I think these issues are fascinating. I think courts often err in sealing cases, the courtroom. Clearly the pressure, which is right-minded from the Administrative Office of the Courts and the appellate courts, is that matters in cases and documents should be sealed only when necessary.

I'm going to have to do a little bit of research as to a corporate representative. I've never been presented with this issue in the 22 years I've been on the bench. So I'm sensitive to your concerns.

MR. GILL: I appreciate that, Judge. I have tried a number of trade secrets cases and I've never had a corporate representative excluded from the courtroom at trial.

THE COURT: I've also had those sorts of arguments made to me and I have found that the law is to the contrary.

So I'm going to -- I'm going to research the law and find out.

MR. RUBMAN: And, Your Honor, we're happy to have it go both ways. We didn't mean to suggest that our person would be able to sit through the whole trial. If you're sealing it for some things, we're happy -- we want it to go both ways. We're not suggesting we should allow our corporate representatives to hear everything.

THE COURT: Sure, sure. All right. Any other

housekeepi ng --

MR. GILL: Actually, one additional issue that's exhibit related, Judge. And that is -- and actually this is probably a mooted issue based on your statement that you're willing to go completely electronic. But a number of the documents in this case are Excel spreadsheets and they have been produced in native format. So we can display them on a screen and they look nice on a screen and we can manipulate them on a screen. They're very difficult to print out and make hard copies of. They print out with a large number of pages, you know, chopping up the data on different pages in a way it's very hard to follow.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: But based on your ruling, I don't think we're going to have an issue on being able to use those in a good way. The hard copy -- and we can certainly produce electronic copies of everything. If that's sufficient for you, that's great. I know for purposes of transmission of the appellate record, I know that that's traditionally done electronically now. So it may be that we don't need to worry about anything else for purposes of the record.

THE COURT: It would seem to moot the problem.

MR. GILL: I think that's right.

THE COURT: Right. Any housekeeping matters that we have not discussed?

MR. RUBMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Gill did a great job going through our list as well so we're all set, except one issue as I stand here.

The normal hours that you'd like us here, starting and stopping for lunch, and then how long? These are the important things; we have to figure out where everyone's eating lunch.

But what's your preference on that?

THE COURT: Well, my preference -- and we can discuss this; I'm not set in stone at all -- but would be 9:00 to 5:00 with an hour, wherever the hour most appropriately falls. It doesn't need to be at straight up 12:00. It could be 12:30, it could be at 1:00, depending on whether we're close to the end of a witness who could be put on an airplane and sent off to do productive things.

MR. RUBMAN: Sure. Perfect.

THE COURT: But that would be my recommendation. So that's -- well, that would only allow for seven hours per day.

Any thoughts?

MR. RUBMAN: That's fine with us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Gill?

MR. GILL: I think that's fine as well, Your Honor.

One related note on witnesses, and that is it may be helpful for the parties to inform the court and opposing counsel who they plan on calling. So, for example, for the plaintiff to tell us who they're going to put on on Monday, it

helps us be able to figure out what to do with regard to management of our own evidence, particularly if scope of cross is not limited to direct. And vice versa. We would obviously do the same thing for them when we're in our case in chief, telling them who we're going to put on the stand and what we expect the presentation of evidence to be.

THE COURT: Well, that's the normal practice around here. At a minimum, inform counsel the evening before who you're going to produce the next day. Is that what you're suggesting?

MR. GILL: We agree with that.

MR. RUBMAN: Yeah. I was going to suggest 48 hours but we can -- maybe we can talk about it.

MR. GILL: Sure, we can talk. But that's fine.

THE COURT: Can you do 48 hours?

MR. GILL: I don't see why not.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RUBMAN: And then we would -- we would -- normally I find that we also tell the court so that we can submit something to the court so you know who's coming, if you'd like.

MR. GILL: If you want.

THE COURT: It would be sometimes helpful. Most of the time it's more important that you know. But obviously if you can transmit that to opposing counsel, you might as well

1 let us know as well so I can maybe get ready for a particular 2 wi tness. MR. RUBMAN: 3 Sure. 4 THE COURT: Now, I don't want to suggest that at 5 straight-up 5:00 we're going to stop. Obviously, again, if 6 there's a witness that we can get on a plane and out of town, 7 if we take an additional, you know, 35 minutes, we're going to 8 do that to accommodate that witness. So --9 MR. GILL: Thank you, Judge. 10 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 11 MR. RUBMAN: Nope. Thank you. 12 THE COURT: All right. When can you submit a 13 revised proposed pretrial order? 14 MR. GILL: This is the first suggestion that -- or 15 thought we had on our side that we would need to submit a 16 revised order, Your Honor. Do you mean based on today's 17 rul i ngs? 18 THE COURT: Correct. 19 MR. GILL: Is there any reason -- we've asked your 20 court reporter for a transcript of today. Is there any reason 21 why we couldn't just use that instead of revising the order? 22 **THE COURT:** I would prefer a revised order. 23 Obviously, the record today will reflect my rulings on these 24 various issues that you've set out. But it's not --25 MR. GILL: Correct.

THE COURT: -- my practice to have a pretrial order where you all argue about what cases -- or what claims are going to be presented at trial. I want a pretrial order setting forth and governing the course of the trial based, at least in part, on these rulings today.

MR. GILL: Okay.

MR. RUBMAN: Can I suggest -- we have our pretrial briefs due on Monday, I believe. How about a week from -- so next Wednesday?

THE COURT: That's fine with me.

MR. RUBMAN: If that's okay with you?

MR. GILL: We can live with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GILL: And that actually unfortunately reminds me of a couple other things --

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. GILL: -- that we need to discuss.

THE COURT: I'd rather address it today.

MR. GILL: With respect to briefs, obviously the parties submitted a document to Your Honor asking what Your Honor wanted, and I think Your Honor said to us that this case has been pretty well briefed, but if we felt the need to brief something, we could file a brief of up to twenty pages.

With respect to, for example, when we had summary judgment argument, the plaintiff had some significant

PowerPoint preparations they presented at the morning of trial.

We obviously hadn't seen those before and would not have a chance to respond to something like that.

Can we have an understanding that whatever brief is submitted is submitted on the deadline on the 9th and there's not going to be any further submission on the morning of trial that we don't have an opportunity to respond to?

THE COURT: Well, if it's submitted on the morning of trial, the court's not going to be -- have the opportunity to read it. So any -- don't we have a deadline for any trial briefs? That's typically in our schedule.

MR. GILL: I think it's the 9th. Right. I think it's the 9th, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Which is next Monday?

MR. GILL: Right.

THE COURT: Well, that's the order of the court.

MR. GILL: That's the deadline?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GILL: All right. And the only remaining is to -- and this relates to the plaintiff's witnesses because the plaintiff had identified, I believe, 20 witnesses on its expect-to-call list and another 18, I believe, on the may call should the need arise. And I don't know if the plaintiff still plans to call the may-call witnesses. It seems to me that some of them may be mooted. I don't recall seeing a statement of

what the testimony would be from those witnesses. So if the plaintiff is going to call those witnesses, we would request that as part of the revised pretrial order.

THE COURT: I didn't scrutinize the appendices here with regard to witnesses. Was there expected testimony not set forth in the -- well, there, I'm looking at appendix D, VGT witnesses

MR. RUBMAN: Your Honor, I think the issue is is that in your form pretrial order, it refers to identifying and describe the testimony of the witnesses that you will call.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RUBMAN: And so that's what we limited it to.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. RUBMAN: And I understand defendants also included descriptions for their may-calls, but we didn't understand that that was required by your pretrial order. That's the difference.

THE COURT: Well, it looks to me, as I'm looking at appendix E, you've describe what the witnesses on your may-call list are expected to testify about.

MR. RUBMAN: That's what Castle Hill did. Ours is -- ours is --

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.

MR. RUBMAN: -- appendix D. We included descriptions only for our will-call list which is what we

1 understood the rule to say. 2 THE COURT: Okay. I would ask that you specify what these may-call witnesses --3 4 MR. RUBMAN: Okay. 5 THE COURT: -- are expected to testify about as well. 6 7 MR. RUBMAN: Sure. We can add that. 8 THE COURT: So you didn't even list those may-call 9 wi tnesses? 10 MR. RUBMAN: The may-call are in the pretrial 11 disclosures --12 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 13 MR. RUBMAN: -- which were submitted a few days or a 14 week before so they do have that list. But in the pretrial 15 order, we understood that it was just limited it to the 16 will-calls was our reading. 17 All right. We'll take a look at that THE COURT: 18 But I'd ask that you include then in your appendix D 19 those that you may call as well as the summary of their 20 expected testimony. 21 MR. RUBMAN: 0kay. 22 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 23 MR. RUBMAN: Thank you. 24 MR. GILL: Nothing else from the defendant, Your

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Honor.

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in any way to resolve this matter?

THE COURT:

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MR. GILL: Yes is the short answer.

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THE COURT: All right. The magistrate judge said he

In the ordinary case, counsel are, you know, integrally

Right. I think at this point the

All right. And have you all attempted

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would stand ready, if necessary.

MR. GILL:

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logistics of involving the magistrate judge might make that

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difficult given the location of the parties.

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involved in the discussions and negotiations. There are --

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it's my understanding is there are active discussions that are

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underway between a representative of the plaintiff and the CEO

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of my client which counsel are not in the middle of. And it's

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my understanding generally, not having been in the middle of

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those negotiations, that they've actually made fairly

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significant progress and that there remains a possibility that

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this case may resolve.

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not inaccurate. We are involved and we're familiar with what's

MR. RUBMAN: I just want to make sure the record's

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going on, and I believe Mr. Jacobs is involved as well, who's

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on the phone, from what we can tell. There are -- there have

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been drafts that have gone back and forth. Whether we'll get

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to the finish line or not is anyone's guess.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, very well. We'll stand ready to try it, if necessary, and let me know if any

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other issues pop up prior to trial.

We, I think, have our decks cleared. No criminal cases set for trial? I guess we had the Tan case, which interestingly is alleged theft of trade secrets from Phillips 66 by a Chinese national educated at Caltech. FBI contends that certain trade secrets with regard to the manufacture of high-tech coke used in the production of metals for batteries has been sent to China. So interesting. But I think the attorneys who are trying to set up depositions of Chinese nationals in Hong Kong are having some difficulties, as might be expected right now.

Anyway, thank you all very much and we're adjourned.

MR. GILL: Thank you, Judge.

MR. RUBMAN: Thank you.

(The proceedings were concluded)

I, Brian P. Neil, a Certified Court Reporter for the Northern District of Oklahoma, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes and is a true record of the proceedings held in above-captioned case.

I further certify that I am not employed by or related to any party to this action by blood or marriage and that I am in no way interested in the outcome of this matter.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5th day of September 2019.

s/ Brian P. Neil

Brian P. Neil, RMR-CRR United States Court Reporter